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Estate of GRACE VIVIAN TEEL, Deceased. 1':::'~ McDOWELL TEEL, Respondent, v. ADELE ARBO, as Administratrix, etc., Appellant.
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[I} Homesteads-AbandoDDlent.-A property eettlement agreement between husband and wift! and a deed from the husband
to the wife of bis Interest in the community property arc ineffectual as declarations of abandonment o! a homestcftd previously declared by the wife on the property, where therp. is
no evidence that either tile agreement or the deed was jointly
acknowledged by the spous,~s or that the instruments werc
recorded. (Civ. Code, I§ 1242-1244.)
[2J Id.-Death-E1fect of Deed from 0113 Spouse to Other.Where the statutory requirl:.ments as to ~t.:;.ndonment of .a
homestead were not strictly complied with, the ('tIcct of •
property settlt!ment agreement betwc£'D husband and wife and
• deed from the husband to the wife of his interest in community property on which the wife had pl'oviously declared
a homestead was, not to terminate the homostc:1d with its
right of survivorship in the surviving husblUld, but to convey
the property to decedent as her separate property.
[3] Id.-Divorce-Eifect of Decree.-Where the court on grnnting the wife a divorce made an assignment to her of a homestead which she had previously selected out of the community
property, the husband can claim no interest in the property.
(Civ. Code, § 146.)
[4] Id.-Abandonment-Decl.aration-Oontract.-The facts that a
property settlement agrt-'Cment between husband and wife does
not refer to II. recorded homestead and that the husband did
not have actul\l knowledge thercof at the time the agrC<'mcnt
was executed, are material to the question whether it WAS the
parties' intention to convey the homestead to the wife hy the
agreement.
[6] Id.-AbandoDDlent-Declaration-Oontract.-Where husband
anC: wife cntored into a property settlemr.nt Agrcement by
which the husbnnd agreed to convey to the wifl' "all of his
right, title, clnim and interest in and to" the prop",rty, which
was hold "as joint tcnnnts with right of "Iurvivorship," and
also agreed to forc~o, without reservation, the II.Ssertion of
[lJ See 13 Cal.Jur. 513; 20 Am.Jur. 118.
McK. Dig. l"eferences: [1) Homesteads, § 109; [2] Homesteads.
§ 130; f3) Homestcnds, § 146: [4, 6] Homesteads, § 113; [6] Di'Vorce, § ~O; [7] Divorce, § 223.
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any future claim he might have to the community property"
including the right to a homestead, which the wife had pre!;
viously declared thereon, the parties intended to effect a com~·
plete adjustment of all their right to the property ine.ludint
the homestead declaration thereon.
';'
[6] Divorce-Disposition of Property-Oommunity Homestead......,
It is within the jurisdiction of the court in a divorce actiori~
to assign to the wife a homestead previously selected by het:
out of the community property, since the property rights ~
the parties are put in issue. (Civ. Code, § 146(3).)
[7] Id.-Disposition of Property-Effect of Agreement of Parties.
-Where an interlocutory divorce decree approving a property .
settlement agreement has become final, it cannot be attacked
eollaterally by the surviving husband in a proc'ledinb to set
apart to him a homestead selected by decedent out of the com;
mumty property, and he is barred from asserting any interest.
in the homestead.
'!-,

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Loa
Angeles County setting apart to decedent's divorced husband.
a homest4.lad selected by decedent out of community property.
Newcomb Condee, Judge. Reversed.
Marion P. Betty for Appellant.
Nixon A. Lange and Charles E. Beardsley for Respondent.;.
TRAYNOR, J.-In the proceedings for the administration
of the estate of decedent, her divorced husband petitioned
to have set apart to him a house and lot selected as a home- ..
stead by decedent out of community property. The pro-:
bate court found that the homestead was valid and subsisting;.
at decedent's death and that title thereto vested in petitioner:
as the surviving spouse. The administratrix appeals from:;
the order granting the petition.
1
Petitioner and decedent were married in 1933 and there-'~
after occupied the property until after January 11, 1945.
In 1944, petitioner commenced an action for divorce and .'
decedent cross-complained for separate maintenance. On Jan- .
uary 11, 1945. decedent filed a declaration of homestead on·',
the property without the actual knowledge of petitioner.
In March. 1945, petitioner and decedent entered into •
property settlement agreement whereby petitioner agreed to
convey to his "wife as her separate property, all of his right,
title, claim and interest in and to the community properly of
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the parties, consisting of a house and lot . . . which prop·
erty is held as joint tenants with right of survivorship; the
foregoing is to be effective when wife procures her interlocutory decree of divorce. . . ." The agrl'ement also provided
that "Each party does hereby release. relinquish and waive
to the other any and all claims be or she may now have or
may hereafter acquire against the other for support and maintenance, or otherwise and does hereby release, relinquish and
waive all rights to administer upon the estate of the other
after the death of such other, and does hereby release, relinquish and waive unto such party his or her successors and nezt
of kin or heirs at law any right or claim for family allowance,
homestead, support or maintenance, or otherwise, against such
other's estate, and agrees not to hereafter claim any interest
in the other's property, except as herein provided." [Italics
added.]
On May 1, 1945, decedent amended her cross-complaint
to pray for divorce and was granted an interlocutory decree
approving the property settlement agreement. On the same
date, pursuant to the agreement, petitioner executed a deed
conveying the property to decedent. No appeal was taken
from the interlocutory decree, and it has now become final.
On May 27, 1945, decedent died.
Thereafter, petitioner filed an action in equity against the
administratrix of decedent's estate, alleging that he and
decedent had become reconciled and that they had orally
agreed to cancel the deed conveying the property. He prayed
that the interlocutory decree of divorce be vacated. the property settlement agreement be set aside, and the deed be cancelled. The' court entered judgment for the administratrix,
finding that at the time of decedent's death the property was
her separate property and the administratrix had the right
to possession thereof. That judgment has now become final.
"If the homestead selected by the husband and wife, or either
of them, during their coverture, and recorded while both
were living, was selected from the community property . . .
it vests, on the death of either spouse, absolutely in the survivor." (Prob. Code, § 663; see, also, Civ.Code, § 1265.) Since
the interlocutory decree of divorce did not dissolve the mar·
riage (Estate of Seiler, 164 Cal. 181 [128 P. 334, Ann. Cas.
1914B 1093]; Estate of Dargie, 162 Cal. 51 [121 P. 320]),
petitioner is entitled to the property as the surviving spouse
unless the homestead was abandoned by the property settlement agreement or deed to the property, or unless he is barred
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from asserting any interest in the propt>rty by rt>ason of the
judgments in the divorce or equity actions.
[1] The property settlement agreeruent and deed were ineffectual as declarations of abandonment of the homestt>llfl.
•• A homestead can bt' abandoned only by a declaration of
abandonment, or a grant thereof, executed and acknowledged:
1. By the husband and wife, if the claimant is married . . ."
(Civ. Code, § 1243: see, also, Civ. Code, § 1242) and .. is
effectual· only from the time it is filed in the office in which
the homestead was recorded." (Civ. Code, § 1244.) There
is no evidence that either the agreement or the deed was jointly
acknowledged by petitioner and decedent or that these instruments were recorded. [2] Since the statutory requirements must be strictly complied with (Dixon v. Russell, 9 Cal.
2d 262 [70 P.2d 196]; Freiermuth v. Steigleman, 130 Cal.
392 [62 P. 615, SO Am.St.R~p. 13S]), it must be concluded
that the effect of these instruments was, not to terminate the
homestead with its right to survivorship in the surviving
spouse, but to convey the property to decedent as her separate
property. (Dixon v. Russell, supra, 9 Cal.2d 262: Wall v.
Brown, 162 Cal. 307 [122 P. 47S] ; Brandon v. Faria, 99 Cal.
App. 594 [279 P. 192].)
Appellant asserts, however, that the interlocutory decree
of divorce effectually and finally disposed of the property
rights of the parties and cannot be attacked in this proceeding, since the time for appeal therefrom has elapsed.
[3] Section 146 of the Civil Code provides: "If a homeRtt>ad has been selected from the community property, it may
br assigned to the party to whom the divorce is granted. . . .
ThE:' assignment may be either absolutely or for a limited
period . . . . " Accordingly, if the court in the divorce action
made an assignment of the homestead to decedent, petitioner
can claim no interest in the property. (Simpson v. Simpson. 80
Cal. 237 [22 P. 167] ; Towne v. Towne, 6 Cal.App. 697 [92 P.
1050].) Appellant contends that the court made such an as-.
signment by approving the property settlement agreement.
Two questions are thus presented: (1) Did the partit>!I
intend by the instruments in question to effect a complt>tt'
and final settlement of all their rights to the property including any right to a homestead tliat may have bt>en declared thereon T (2) Was the court's approval of the agreement tantamount to an assignment of the homestead to deeed('nt T I f, as petitiont>r as!lt>rtR. thl' partil'R /lid not intt>nd to
convey the homestead to decrucnt, mere approval of the

)

)
Sept. 1949]

ESTATE OF TEEL
(14 C.2d 148: 210 P.2d l]

858

. agreement by the eourt could not terminate petitiClneI"e interest therein.
[4] Petitioner points out that the agreement doee not
refer to the recorded homestead and that he did not have
actual knowledge thereof at the time the agreement was execllted. These facts are of cOllrse material to th~ question
whether it was the parties' intention to convey the t.(JUlestead
to decedent by the agreement in qUE'stion. It has }.lt06n beld,
however, that an instrument is effective as a d~l&t'ation of
abandonment of 8 homestead even though it mallCfJ no reference thereto, when the obje<!t of the instrument is to effect
a "complete settlement and adjustment of all th(~i" property
rights." (Estate of Winslow, 121 Cal. 92,94 [53 P. 362}.)
[5] Petitioner conveyed to decedent •• all of hu. right, title, .
claim and interest in and to" the property whiel., the agreement recites, was held by the parties "as joint tllnants with
right of survivorship." He also agreed to fore80, without
reservation, the assertion of any future claim he might have
to the property including the right to a homestl~ad therein.
If petitioner's iIiterest in the homestead persilts notwithstanding these instruments, it is obvious that petitioner did
not convey "all of his interest" in the property, yet that
is the plain import of the language he employed. If peti- .
tioner may now assert a claim to the property based upon
survivorship in the homestead, it is evident that he does so in
the face of his express promise not to •• claim any interest in
[decedent's J property" and his express relinquishment of any
right to a homestead therein.
It is clear from the instruments in question that the
parties intended to effect a complete adjustment of all their
rights to the property including the homE'Rt.ell.d declared
thereon. (Estate of Winslow, supra, 121 Cal. 92.) [6] Independently of the property settlement agreement, it was within
the jurisdiction of the court in the divorce action to assign
. the homestead to decedent, since the property rights of the
. parties were put in issue. (Civ. Code, § 146(3), supra.) The
court made such an assignment by approving the agreement
by which petitioner agreed to convey all his interest in the·
property to decedent and waived all his rights therein. (Totone
v. Towne, 6 Cal.App. 697, 704-706 [92 P. 10501.)
[7] Petitioner contends, however, that an interlocutory
decree of divorce cannot of itself· eJfect a final disposition
.. c.au-u

\
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of tile property rights of the parties, citing Remley v. Rf'~
lcy,49 Cal.App. 489 [193 P.604] and Leavitt v. Lr.o11;tl. 1!l1
Cal.App. 145 [24 P.2d 910]. In the cited cases,appeal!'> were".
taken from interlocutory decrees of divorce. It was tht'ie:<
held that the trial court erred in attempting to make filla' ~
disposition of the homestead in the interlocutory d(>cree. since:
the homestead persisted until entry of the final decree. . .'~,
In the present proceeding, however, the time for appf'at
from the interlocutory decrt'e bas elapsed. Petitioner 8ef'ks
to attack that decree collaterally. In Leupc v. Loupe, 21 Cal. i
;!d 145 [130 P.2d 697], this court beldthat the immediait:
disposal of property by an interlocutory decree is within the
jurisdiction of the tria] court and that the decree cannot be
modified after it has become final. Accordingly, since the
interlocutory decree approving the property settlement agree-'
ment has become final, it cannot be attacked by petitioner in"
this proceeding. Petitioner is therefore barred from assert- . '
ing any interest in the homestead.
.
The order is reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., and Spence, J.t «)n-:;,
'enned.
"
CARTER, J.-I concur in the conclusion reached, but it;
appears doubtful law to hold that a deed from husband to'~
wife, coupled with a property settlement agreement of the
type ,here involved, is not sufficient to constitute an aban-··
rlonment of the homestead as far as the hubaud is concerned. '
That does not mean that the homestead would not be good :
as against creditors. It would mean only that the husband;
has forfeited his right to take as survivor of his wife. There,
is a valid distinction between such a transaction and one'
where one spouse is conveying to a stranger. In that case,
the homestead protection against creditors is lost .. Such pro- .;,
tection is the purpose of homestead laws. It is clear bere, 'i
as pointed out by the majority opinion, that the property "
settlement agreement and deed evinced an unequivocal agree-,
ment by the husband to give up his right of survivorship.:'
He has done all he could to do so, and therefore has no standing to claim otherwise. Rather than protecting his wife who
did not join in the execution of the deed, the rule protects the
husband. While it is true that some cases have held in accordance with the majority view on this point, I am inclined
to think they should be overruled. At least, it is not necea-
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sary to reaffirm them and give new vitality to tht''!ll in th ill
case, for the opinion holds that the interlocutory decrel' of
divorce assigned the homestead to the wife, thereby d!'priving the husband of his right of survivorship thereunder. That
bcing so, it could be assumed, witho1tt deciding, that the deed
and property settlement agreement involved in this case are
insufficient for that purpose, but this precise point should
be left open for future consideration by this court should
a similar factual situation be presented.
SCHAUER, J.-I dillSent. I do Dot agree that "The court
made such an assignment [of the recorded homestead. the
existence of which was unknown to the court and to the petitioner, and which wa:> not mentioned in either the property
settlement agreement or in the interlocutory decree] by lipproving the agreement by which petitioner agreed to convey all
his interest in the property to decedent and waived all his rights
therein." Such holdillg is inconsistent in principle with the
very cases cited earlier in the opinion. The judgment of the
trial court should be affirmed.

